

Attitudes Towards Immigration and Vote Choice in Ecuador

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1 Introduction

During the past decade, Latin American countries have experienced strong economic growth accompanied by profound social and political changes. In analyzing those changes, the scholarly literature has predominantly concentrated on the electoral successes of the left rooted in an egalitarian agenda. Recent ideological dealignments in Latin America, however, call into question the left's issue ownership of inequality and highlight shifts in the traditional struggle between left and right. These developments also underscore the exploitation of non-distributive issues as a viable strategy for the right and thus the potential for electoral mobilization through valence competition (Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2014).

In this context the remarkable increase in South-South migration as a defining characteristic of this period of strong economic growth has been largely ignored. As a region, from 2000 to 2010 Latin America and the Caribbean experienced an annual rate of

change in international migration stock of 2.2 percent, comparable with Europe's rate of change of 2.1 percent during the same time period (United Nations 2013). In Chile, for instance, the number of immigrants doubled during this decade. While in 2000 the country had a stock of 177 332 migrants, the group of immigrants comprised 369 436 in 2010. This translates into an annual rate of change of 7.3 percent, the second highest in the region after Ecuador's of 11.7 percent (United Nations 2013).¹

Hatton and Williamson (2005, p.36) rightly point out that these South-South flows will create "new problems for newly industrial countries". Costa Rican ex-president Laura Chinchilla, for instance, voiced in her role as then Minister of Justice concerns regarding the potential impact uncontrolled immigration could have on employment, security or social services, among other things (La Nacion, 2004). Ex-president Piñera (2010-2014) did not mention the issue of immigration once in his 2009 manifesto "75 commitments to Chile". Reacting to mounting pressures he did, however, present in July 2012 a legislative proposal to change the immigration legislation in force since 1975 which was considered not only to be outdated, but a mayor factor facilitating illegal immigration into Chile. While the aim of the law was to regulate illegal immigration of which Piñera assured in 2013 "it is hurting Chileans" (La Tercera 2013), at the same time it proposed an exception clause to the limit of 15 percent of foreign workers in companies, a measure unions fiercely opposed. Piñera left his presidency without having implemented a new regulation.

Hence, although presidential candidates rarely campaign on this issue nor do we find political parties using it centrally, it certainly is on the political agenda and potentially contentious. In fact, trends in public opinion seem to suggest that the impact of the increase in immigration is not only already noticeable, but that we also find considerable variation among countries when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants. In 2002, for instance, in only three countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa Rica) did more than forty percent of the population strongly agree or agree with the statement that there should be a law preventing immigrants from entering. In 2009 we find this considerable agreement in favor of stronger migration flow controls already in seven countries.² And while in 2002 in eight countries more than fifty percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed

¹In 2000 Ecuador's migrant stock was 101 352 which more than tripled to 325 668 in 2010. Although Ecuador is also recipient of a considerable number of Colombian refugees, they account for only 37.2 percent of all migrants in 2010 (and 34.4 percent in 2013). In 2013 the international migrant stock was 398 251 in Chile and 359 315 in Ecuador.

²Data taken from Latinobarómetro 2002 and 2009. With thirty-nine percent in 2009 Costa Rica came close to forty percent of respondents agreeing to this statement. During this time period Costa Rica had an annual rate of change in international migration of 2.7 percent, while Bolivia's was 4.9 percent.

with the statement that immigrants are taking away native's jobs, this was the case in ten countries in 2009. In Uruguay, in turn, the agreement with both statements was remarkably low and consistently so, the only country, together with Brazil, experiencing a negative annual rate of migration flows.

Immigration, therefore, appears to be an issue of public concern. Yet, we know very little about the driving factors behind attitudes towards immigrants in Latin America and much less whether they influence vote choices across the region. This paper seeks to start filling the existing void and contribute to answering these questions. We postulate that individuals who have not been able to benefit from the economic bonanza from past decade and are therefore more vulnerable will be more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat. They will therefore be more prone to hostility towards immigrants, attributing responsibility for social problems to immigration. Individuals who consistently do so, should take this into consideration when it comes to vote choice.

Using original survey data, we explore these relationships for the case of Ecuador. Ecuador has been undergoing a sustained period of economic progress with average annual growth in GDP of about 4 percent (WDI 2013) during the past decade, unemployment rates below 5 percent and growing wages. As mentioned above, it also experienced the highest annual rate of change of migration flows (United Nations 2013). During the same time period, public opinion data manifests a drastic rise in support for tougher anti-immigration laws from 35 percent in 2002 to 62 percent in 2009, and from 41 percent in 2002 to 63 percent in 2009 for the notion that immigrant workers constitute a mayor job competition for nationals. Taken together, these developments make Ecuador an excellent starting point for our purpose.

2 Immigration Attitudes in Ecuador

As how much of a problem do citizens perceive immigration? What drives attitudes towards immigrants? Do respondents who display negative attitudes towards migrants take immigration as an issue into consideration when deciding for whom to cast their vote? Explanations for anti-immigration attitudes broadly revolve around economic explanations, the perception of immigrants as a cultural threat, and individual personalities. Research has consistently demonstrated that concerns over economic well-being are related to opposition to immigration (Lawrence 2011, Sniderman et al. 2000, 2004). Especially in countries undergoing profound transformations, relative comparisons matter most, regarding both, comparisons with reference groups, but also with one's own prior living conditions. This is due to the changing nature of reference norms and as-

pirations of social mobility, which tends to affect mostly individuals in the middle of the distribution, who may even have experienced the largest absolute gains, yet find themselves subjectively in a vulnerable position (see Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2013). We therefore expect individuals who perceive themselves as losers of recent economic changes to be more prone to hostility towards immigrants. Perceiving immigration as a cultural threat has often been linked to differences in language and religion (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2004) and it has been argued that underlying such attitudes is the fear of cultural change (Massey 1995). Factors such as language and religion are less likely to play a role in hostility towards South-South migration observed in Latin America. Hence we rather expect to see a similar mechanism at work through an individual's personality. Those who are more open to changes of their circumstances should be more open to receiving migrants and articulate more favorable views towards immigration.

Existing public opinion data, however, is not suited to explore our questions of interest in more depth. The two leading surveys in the region, for instance, largely ignore the topic of immigration. The Latinobarómetro survey includes three questions in 2002 of which two are repeated in 2009 – the questions we use above – and one again in 2010. The AmericasBarometer in turn has so far covered this topic only once in 2008 with two questions, one about job competition and one on the access to social services. Yet, a defining feature of prejudice and hostility towards others is the consistency with which a person attributes negative characteristics or refrains from attributing positive characteristics to a group (Sniderman et al. 2003). Hence, relying on such a reduced number of questions that also probe into different aspects of attitudes towards immigration is potentially misleading.³ In addition, available public opinion surveys typically lack questions needed to measure facets of personality, or questions that would facilitate providing a more complete picture of citizens' concerns regarding immigration and its link to voting considerations.

To circumvent these limitations, we administered in May 2015 an original survey to 501 respondents in Ecuador selected from a commercial - by invitation only - on-line pool of respondents (ISO 26362 certified) aged 18-65. The sample was stratified using sex and age and the online administration helps us to avoid social desirability.⁴

To gauge respondents' attitudes towards immigrants, we include eight questions in

³As pointed out, studies on immigration attitudes in Latin America are few and far between. One rare example is Lawrence (2011) who uses the Latinobarómetro question on immigration laws.

⁴Currently the provider cannot guarantee more than 500 respondents in Ecuador. We need to keep in mind, of course, that this is strictly speaking not a representative sample. The age range is quite common for on-line surveys and in our case students as an occupational category are slightly oversampled, yet subjective income normally distributed. Of those questions we have in common with other surveys, however, attitudes are in line with previous results.




Figure 1: Attitudes towards Values and Rights

our survey that fall into two different categories.⁵ The first group is comprised of three questions aiming at gathering attitudes towards normative issues while the remaining five questions probe into the propensity of respondents to attribute negative effects to the presence of immigrants in Ecuador. Figure 1 shows the results for the normative questions and highlights that in general respondents manifest predominantly positive views on these items.⁶ 72 percent of respondents are in favor of granting immigrants the same rights as any other person. Almost a quarter of respondents strongly disagree with the idea of stricter immigration laws preventing immigrants from entering the country, which means that together with the group disagreeing with this statement, a total of 67.2 percent of respondents are opposing tighter controls.⁷ Interestingly, with 55.9 percent the lowest agreement can be noted with the notion that Ecuador has the responsibility to accept immigrants from war-ridden countries.

Although a majority of respondents therefore seems to shy away from implementing

⁵See appendix for details on question wording.

⁶We exclude eight respondents who do not hold Ecuadorian nationality from all our calculations presented in this paper.

⁷This is comparable to 2002 levels reflected in the Latinobarómetro.




Figure 2: Attitudes towards the Impact of Immigrants

restrictions on migration flows, Figure 2 shows that the presence of migrants in Ecuador is perceived as having rather negative social and economic consequences. Two-thirds of respondents agree with the idea that immigrants constitute job competition to Ecuadorians, while 57.4 percent disagree or strongly disagree with the idea that immigration is beneficial for the economy. A striking 71.2 percent believes that Ecuadorians should be given priority in case jobs are getting scarce, a statement with which 40.8 percent of respondents strongly agree. The social impact of migrants is considered equally detrimental. 60.7 percent of respondents think that immigrants worsen the crime problems in the country, while still 48.1 percent believe that immigrants exploit social benefits, although only 16.6 percent agree strongly with the latter notion.

Since we expect to observe a major difference of attitudes towards immigrants depending on whether respondents consider themselves as economic winners rather than economic losers, we compare the responses to our attitudinal questions for both groups separately. To be able to distinguish between those who benefitted from Ecuador's strong economic gains during the last decade and those who did not, we ask respondents to compare their current economic situation with their economic situation from ten years




Figure 3: Attitudes of Winners and Losers I

ago. 63.47 percent of respondents consider that their economic situation has improved, compared with 11.58 percent who believe that their situation has not changed at all, while 24.95 percent think that it has become worse. We construct a dummy variable that considers those who report an improvement as winners while those who have seen their situation stagnating or worsening are labeled as losers.

Figures 3 and 4 show the results of this comparison. On all questions, be it regarding normative items or in relation to attitudes regarding the social and economic impact of immigrants, it appears that economic losers have in general a rather distinct view compared to those respondents who consider themselves as being better off. 68.72 percent of economic losers, for instance, strongly agree or agree with the idea of giving immigrants the same right as anybody else. While this is an overwhelming majority, the corresponding figure of 73.88 percent agreement of economic winners is slightly higher, largely due to the strong disagreement to this question by economic losers. However, Fisher's exact test shows that the observed associations are not significant. In contrast, the observed differences regarding agreement for stricter immigration laws and disagreement regarding the responsibility of accepting migrants from war zones among winners




Figure 4: Attitudes of Winners and Losers II

and losers reach statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent level respectively.⁸

Of the items that capture attitudes regarding the impact of the influx of immigrants, winners and losers only show distinctive associations across answering categories regarding the issues of crime and job competition. For both questions the observed differences reach statistical significance at the 5 percent level and it is particularly telling that in both instances the category of strong agreement shows a difference of roughly 10 percentage points. Whereas only 24.44 percent of winners perceive immigrants as serious job competition, this is the case for 33.90 percent of economic losers. Of the latter group 33.71 strongly agree with the idea that immigration is responsible for worsening Ecuador's crime problems compared to 23.15 percent of those who perceive their economic situation as having improved. Although the figures show differences in the distribution in answering categories for the exploitation of benefits, job priority for Ecuadorians in light of a worsening economic situation and the notion that immigration benefits

⁸The largest differences can be observed in the categories of strongly agreeing with tighter laws (19.66 percent of losers vs. 11.22 percent of winners) and of strongly disagreeing with the responsibility of taking in asylum seekers (20.11 percent of losers vs. 11.00 percent of winners).

Table 1: Immigration Attitudes of Winners and Losers

	(1) Blame	(2) Values
Loser	-0.103* (0.062)	-0.181*** (0.069)
Ideology	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.031** (0.015)
Education	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.038)
Sex	-0.063 (0.059)	-0.122* (0.063)
Age	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Income Ladder	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.026)
Trust	0.031 (0.067)	0.024 (0.071)
Personality	0.019 (0.060)	0.017 (0.061)
Constant	2.567*** (0.286)	3.163*** (0.251)
Observations	444	452
R2	0.02	0.04

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

the national economy, those differences do not reach statistical significance.⁹

To explore these observed relationships in more detail we estimate regression models in which attitudes towards immigration form the dependent variables. Considering our discussion on the importance of consistency above, no single item can provide a satisfactory indicator of attitudes towards immigrants. We therefore construct two different indices on the basis of the two different categories discussed. In other words, we construct a measure averaging together the three items capturing attitudes towards normative issues and rights, such that a respondent who consistently disagrees with these items receives a 1, while a respondent who consistently agrees, hence is more favorable

⁹However, the differences in judging the notion that immigration is positive for the economy come close to the 10 percent level.

towards migrants, receives a four.¹⁰ Equally, we construct an index based on the five items attributing responsibility for economic and social ills to immigration. A person who consistently attributes negative effects to immigration will receive a one on this index, while a person who disagrees with the notion that immigration is to blame for economic and social consequences will receive a four.¹¹ We label the first index “Values” while the second index is labeled “Blame”.

Our main variable of interest is the dummy variable of whether respondents consider themselves as economic winners or losers. We furthermore expect that individuals who are more open to change will display more favorable attitudes towards migrants. We construct an index based on the items measuring agreement / disagreement questions “probing into a person’s personality along those lines. This index runs from one, being more open to change to five, being less so.¹² Contrary we expect respondents who display less interpersonal trust to show more negative attitudes towards migrants (1-mistrust 0-general trust). We control for ideology (0-left 10-right), income (0-poor 10-rich), education, sex (0-women 1-men) and age.¹³

Table 1 shows the results. Except for the negative assessment of one’s own economic situation today compared to a previous one, although all variables show the expected relationship, none is significantly related to a consistent negative assessments of the impact of immigration. The impact of having not been able to advance during Ecuador’s economic bonanza is even stronger on consistent negative value assessments of immigration, an effect that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Unsurprisingly, being ideologically more leftist exerts a positive effect on the index based on normative connotations of immigration attitudes. Men, however, seem to be less inclined to consider rights for migrants or accepting them on humanitarian grounds. Again, the remaining variables fail to reach statistical significance.

These results indeed highlight that the comparisons with one’s own prior living conditions that imply lost opportunities drive attitudes towards immigrants on both dimensions, normative issues and the attribution of responsibility of negative effects. In the next section we explore the question of how such attitudes are related to considerations of the importance of the issue of immigration, vote choice, and vote intention.

¹⁰Before doing so, the scale of the item regarding accepting immigrants from war zones and granting immigrants the same rights was flipped.

¹¹Again, before constructing the index the scale for the item capturing the idea that immigration is positive for the economy has been flipped.

¹²The items used gather agreement / disagreement to I often have the need to change and reorient my life, I basically want to remain as I am, It is important to venture into something new from time to time, and it is better to stick to the tried and tested.

¹³See appendix for details

3 Immigration Attitudes and Vote Intention

The previous section has highlighted considerable variance of attitudes towards immigrants and also underscored a relationship between such attitudes and a person’s negative evaluation of his or her current personal economic situation in comparison to the one ten years ago. This section will explore the driving factors behind these differences in more depth and whether they are connected to the assessment of immigration as a problem, the consideration of this issue for vote choice and ultimately vote intention.

In a first step, however, we are interested in finding out what attitudes towards immigration flows look like when people believe that they can express what they feel without anyone knowing their position. We therefore implemented a list experiment in our survey (e.g. Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). For this purpose we randomly divided respondents into two different groups. One group received a list of items without the sensitive item – in our case the increase of immigration –, while the other group received the exact same list of items with the sensitive item added. Respondents were prompted to identify *how many* items in the respective lists would apply to them answering the question of how many of the listed items would make them angry or upset, without revealing which ones. The comparison of the test and the control group reveals how many respondents chose the sensitive item. In our case results show that 55.35 percent of respondents are angry or upset over the increase of immigration.¹⁴

A majority therefore seems to be unhappy about the increased influx of migrants into Ecuador. This is quite significant given that immigration is never mentioned in the sections regarding problems the country faces public opinion surveys typically include in the form of an open question. We in turn are interested in prompting respondents to rate immigration in relation to other issues that usually are mentioned in these open question sections, but also in relation to “softer” policy issues that may require attention as they constitute a problem that calls for improvement, but never seem to spring to mind. Respondents were presented with a list of thirteen issues and asked to rate them on a scale from 1 - not an important problem to 10 - a very important problem.¹⁵ In addition we also ask respondents to consider a list of eight different policy areas in terms of their importance when they decide for which party to vote for.

The left hand pane of Figure 5 shows the results for rating issues that may constitute problems requiring policy attention on the degree of importance they have in Ecuador. The first thing that stands out is that on average all topics are rated as relatively impor-

¹⁴Mean of test group (N=246) - mean of control group (N=247) * 100 = 2.715447 - 2.161943 = 0.5535038, and 0.5535038*100 = 55.35 percent of respondents. Non-nationals are excluded from the calculation.

¹⁵see appendix for details.




Figure 5: Immigration as Problem and Issue Importance

tant problems, receiving means larger than 6.9. The top three concerns are corruption, public security, and unemployment. The means of these three items are larger than 8.5 and the relatively small standard deviations (of 1.9, 2.0 and 2.0) suggest considerable agreement. With a mean of 7.29 immigration is still considered as a rather important problem, but populates the end of the list together with inequalities between men and women (mean of 6.94) and minority rights (mean of 6.95). Yet, the standard deviations of 2.5 (immigration), 2.6 (minority rights) and 2.8 (gender equality) suggest a considerable differences in judging whether they constitute an important problem for Ecuador. The right hand pane of Figure 5, in turn, shows the results for the importance of different issues ranging from public services to economic and social policy areas for vote choice. Again, all issues are considered as relatively important. Yet, of this list of policy issues, immigration comes in last, in other words, immigration is attached least importance for vote choice, with only 35.73 percent of respondents considering it as very important compared to 50.50 percent for the issue of redistribution which comes in second to last.

Although a majority of respondents is quite upset in the light of increasing immigration flows, it seems that that at least when put in perspective, immigration is neither

perceived as constituting a particular pressing problem nor does it figure prominently in people's determinants for vote choice. However, we also observe considerable variance in peoples judgment and it is conceivable that those who voice consistently more negative stances towards immigration and those who perceive themselves as having fallen behind in economic terms show a distinct relationship with both, issue importance and vote choice. The first column in Table 2 shows the results for an ordinary least square regression for issue importance. Indeed economic losers consider immigration rather to be an important problem in Ecuador. Interestingly, immigration attitudes are not significantly related to the assesment of immigration as a problem. Higher levels of education, however, also mean that immigration is perceived as less threatening, while female and older respondents seem to be more inclined to attribute importance to this topic. The second column in turn shows the results for a logit regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating those who claim to attribute a lot of importance to immigration when considering for whom to cast their vote. Surprisingly, the indicator of subjective economic advancement does not exert any influence on vote choice. However, anti-immigration attitudes regarding the impact of migration flows are positively connected. The more consistently a respondent attributes responsibility to immigrants for social and economic ills, the higher the likelihood that immigration will be considered for vote choice. Similarly lower levels of education and a lower subjective income level increase the chances of considering immigration when deciding on casting the vote. Unsurprisingly, taking immigration into account for vote choice is also more likely the more importance someone attributes to immigration as a problem.

In a last step we consider the impact of immigration attitudes and subjective perception of economic advancement on vote intention. To be able to do so we asked respondents which party they would vote for if elections were to be held next Sunday. As nearly 50 percent of respondents indicate that they would vote blank, would not vote or do not know, our number of observations drops significantly and we have to take our results with a pinch of salt.

Compared to Movimiento Alianza PAIS Patria, the baseline category, Pachakutik attracts individuals who can be described as economic losers and poorer segments of society. None of the other variables reaches statistical significance.¹⁶ The PSP, in turn, does not show a clear voter profile, except that in comparison to Movimiento Alianza PAIS Patria, more females and rather older respondents seem to be likely voters.¹⁷

¹⁶The value index, however, comes close to the 10 percent level. Given the profile of the party, a positive relationship makes perfectly sense.

¹⁷It should be pointed out that PSP, PS-FA, and Movimiento Unión Ecuatoriano have the lowest cell entrances. However, excluding these parties and rerunning the analysis does not change the results.

Table 2: Immigration Attitudes, Importance and Vote Choice

	(1) Importance	(2) Vote Choice
Loser	0.534** (0.263)	0.058 (0.217)
Ideology	0.055 (0.061)	-0.038 (0.053)
Education	-0.318* (0.166)	-0.296** (0.139)
Sex	-0.423* (0.251)	-0.074 (0.216)
Age	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.003 (0.010)
Income Ladder	0.073 (0.092)	-0.213** (0.084)
Trust	-0.014 (0.301)	0.082 (0.244)
Personality	0.070 (0.229)	-0.031 (0.195)
Blame Index	-0.172 (0.272)	-0.374* (0.216)
Value Index	-0.149 (0.222)	0.205 (0.207)
Problem	-	0.172*** (0.048)
Constant	9.212*** (1.253)	0.888 (1.165)
Observations	441	441
R2	0.05	-
Pseudo R2	-	0.065

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The Christian Socialdemocrats are also favored by economic losers, more conservative and older voters and females. The PS-FA attracts a mix of voters who compared to Movimiento Alianza PAIS Patria are more favorable towards immigrants when it comes to blame attribution, yet less favorable considering normative aspects such as granting rights for migrations. Just like Pachakutik, this party is favored by poorer segments of society and rather female than male voters. None of our variables is significantly related to PA or SUMA, while the Unión Ecuatoriano is considered by younger female voters and those who are consistently attributing blame. The latter is also the case for CREO. In addition, however, economic losers and more conservative respondents intend to vote for this party.

Even considering potential caveats due to the reduced number of cases, the results are quite revealing. It appears that economic losers are attracted to rather a wider range of parties with different profiles, potentially promising to improve their economic situation. Regarding attitudes towards immigrants, the distribution of voters is more distinct. Not by chance do we find significant effects for anti-immigration stances on the impact of immigration for CREO and Unión Ecuatoriano, two parties that have a tendency to use immigration. During his presidential campaign, Guillermo Lasso, CREO's party leader, connected immigration to crime. Unión Ecuatoriano is a rather recent formation whose founder, Washington Pesántez, has attracted negative attention for xenophobic statements already during his time as attorney general.

4 Conclusion

Research on immigration and the rise of far right parties in Europe has received significant attention in the past decade (see for instance). In Latin America, however, this question has been left aside in an attempt to explain the emergence of the left after the fallout of the Washington consensus (Hershberg and Rosen 2006; Roberts 2008; Rodrez, Barrett, and Chavez 2005; Casta and Navia 2007, Baker and Greene 2011). During the last decade, however, most Latin American countries have experienced not only an improvement in their economic conditions but also an increment in south-south migration. In this paper we set out to do a preliminary analysis aimed at understanding the different perceptions and preferences of economic winners and losers. Specifically we looked at the case of Ecuador via an online survey.

As can be seen from our results, even after considering the limitations of the study, we are able to show the emergence of immigration as a possible contentious issue. The significant differences in attitudes and preferences of the immigration issue between

Table 3: Immigration Attitudes and Vote Intention

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Pachakutik	PSP	PSC	PS-FA	PA	Unión Ecuatoriana	CREO	SUMA
Blame index	-0.145 (0.841)	-0.384 (0.935)	-0.162 (0.456)	3.854*** (0.601)	-0.604 (0.435)	-11.606*** (4.360)	-0.994* (0.529)	0.465 (0.789)
Value Index	1.339 (0.839)	-0.932 (0.760)	0.061 (0.431)	-2.554** (1.003)	0.277 (0.365)	0.672 (1.280)	-0.084 (0.379)	-0.589 (0.580)
Loser	1.347* (0.804)	-1.378 (1.585)	1.189*** (0.453)	-0.384 (0.683)	0.584 (0.496)	1.160 (1.277)	1.270** (0.505)	0.667 (0.854)
Ideology	0.256 (0.192)	0.147 (0.149)	0.407*** (0.100)	-0.085 (0.220)	0.130 (0.089)	-0.128 (0.243)	0.295*** (0.099)	0.124 (0.191)
Education	-0.129 (0.516)	-0.937 (0.952)	0.613* (0.320)	-0.427 (0.330)	0.299 (0.277)	0.289 (0.565)	0.328 (0.342)	1.067 (0.652)
Sex	0.015 (0.604)	-4.271*** (1.425)	-0.747* (0.442)	-1.627*** (0.580)	-0.083 (0.415)	-3.090** (1.565)	-0.081 (0.538)	-0.035 (0.946)
Age	0.010 (0.034)	0.222*** (0.053)	0.047** (0.018)	0.004 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.026)	-2.649** (1.253)	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.031)
Income Ladder	-0.789*** (0.280)	-0.480 (0.468)	-0.134 (0.215)	-0.455** (0.196)	0.299 (0.185)	-0.140 (0.500)	-0.122 (0.210)	-0.042 (0.226)
Constant	-4.360 (3.380)	-2.978 (3.324)	-6.643*** (1.956)	-2.695 (2.390)	-3.061 (2.238)	71.565** (29.988)	-1.632 (2.438)	-6.541 (4.237)
Observations	219	219	219	219	219	219	219	219
Pseudo R2	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Pachakutik - Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional; PSP - Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero; PSC - Partido Social Cristiano; PS-FA - Partido Socialista - Frente Amplio; PA - Partido Avanza; CREO - Movimiento Creando Oportunidades; Sociedad Unida Más Acción; Baseoutcome: Movimiento Alianza PAIS Patria

economic winners and losers make this issue one which can possibly be used by political parties to raise their vote share. This is of particular importance if we consider that major economic players in the region (namely Brasil, Chile, and Mexico) have seen their economic progress come to a stop and have instead implemented austerity measures.

IMPROVED VERSION TO COME

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6 Appendix

Question wording

List experiment

Por favor, de las siguientes situaciones, no nos diga cuales, pero indique cuántas de las siguientes situaciones le generan enfado o le molestan:

(BASELINE GROUP)

- El aumento del precio de la gasolina.
- El sueldo multimillonario que ganan algunos deportistas profesionales.
- Tener que llevar el cinturón de seguridad cuando conduzco.
- La contaminación que producen algunas industrias.

(TEST GROUP)

- El aumento del precio de la gasolina.
- El sueldo multimillonario que ganan algunos deportistas profesionales.
- Tener que llevar el cinturón cuando conduzco.
- La contaminación que producen algunas industrias
- El aumento de la inmigración

Blame index

(all 1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-disagree, 4-strongly disagree)

- Vienen a competir por nuestros puestos de trabajo
- Los inmigrantes se aprovechan de los beneficios de la seguridad social
- Los inmigrantes empeoran los problemas de delincuencia en Ecuador
- La inmigración es beneficiosa para la economía. Cuando el empleo escasea, los ecuatorianos deben tener prioridad sobre los inmigrantes en el acceso a un puesto de trabajo.

Value index

(all 1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-disagree, 4-strongly disagree)

- Los inmigrantes deberían tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otra persona
- Debería haber una ley que les impidiera entrar
- Ecuador tiene la responsabilidad de aceptar a inmigrantes provenientes de países en guerra

Personality Index

(all 1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-neither nor, 4-disagree, 5-strongly disagree)

- A menudo tengo la necesidad de cambiar y de reorientar mi vida
- Básicamente quiero seguir siendo como soy
- Es importante de vez en cuando aventurarme en algo nuevo
- Es mejor quedarse con las experiencias probadas

Problems

A continuación, le vamos a mostrar una serie de problemas comunes a muchos países. Podría indicarnos para cada uno de ellos que grado de importancia tienen hoy en Ecuador y siguiendo esta escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 significa no es un problema importante y 10 es un problema muy importante?

(1- It is not an important problem; 10 - It is a very important problem)

- Inflación
- Inseguridad ciudadana y delincuencia

- salud/seguridad social
- educación
- derechos de los grupos étnicos y culturales
- Desempleo y subempleo
- Medio ambiente
- Conflictos entre los poderes del Estado
- Corrupción
- Inmigración
- Deuda externa
- Narcotráfico
- las desigualdades entre hombres y mujeres

Importance for Vote Choice

A la hora de decidir dar su apoyo a un determinado partido qué grado de importancia tiene para Ud. que el partido se preocupe por los siguientes temas?

(1-Very important, 2-Quite important, 3-Of little importance, 4-Not important at all)

- El medio ambiente
- La igualdad entre mujeres y hombres
- La creación de ocupación
- Los servicios públicos de salud
- El sistema educativo pblico
- Los temas relacionados con la inmigración
- La redistribución de la riqueza

Education

Cuál es el nivel más alto de estudios que ha realizado?

Ninguno o primarios incompletos.....1

Primarios.....2

Secundarios/Formación profesional.....	3
Universitarios de grado medio o equivalentes...	4
Universitarios de grado superior.....	5

Trust

Hablando en general, Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno nunca es lo suficientemente cuidadoso en el trato con los demás?

Income Ladder

Imáginese una escala de 10 peldaños, en que en el 1 se ubican las personas más pobres y en el 10 se ubican las personas más ricas, dónde se ubicaría Ud.?